Some Models for Understanding the Incentives for Supply Chain Collaboration by Co, Henry C. & Moosa, Sharafali
Association for Information Systems 
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) 
ICEB 2002 Proceedings International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) 
Winter 12-10-2002 
Some Models for Understanding the Incentives for Supply Chain 
Collaboration 
Henry C. Co 
Sharafali Moosa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://aisel.aisnet.org/iceb2002 
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) at AIS Electronic 
Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ICEB 2002 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS 
Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org. 
Some Models for Understanding the Incentives for Supply Chain Collaboration  
 
Henry C. Co  Sharafali Moosa 
Technology & Operations Management 
California Polytechnic & State University 
3801 W. Temple Ave.,  Pomona. CA 91768 
hco@csupomona.edu 
 
 
Department of Decision Sciences 
National University of Singapore 
10 Kent Ridge Crescent 
Singapore 119260 
 
Abstract 
The need for information sharing has been increasing as 
a consequence of the globalization of production and 
sales, and the advancement of enabling technologies. Yet, 
beyond resolving the technical issues associated with 
information sharing and joint decision making, a greater 
challenge is for the supply chain partners to understand 
the “lost value” due to uncoordinated decision-making, 
and more importantly, to determine how the recovered 
value will be shared among the participating stakeholders. 
This paper presents some models for understanding the 
incentives for supply chain collaboration, and describes 
the enabling technologies for collaborative demand 
planning and replenishment. 
1. Introduction 
Synchronizing the supply chain from raw materials to the 
consumer offers the greatest opportunity to improve 
profitability and provide greater value to the consumer. It 
is quickly becoming the standard for competition.  
1.1 The Bullwhip Effect 
A well-balanced and well-practiced relay team is more 
competitive when each runner knows how to be 
positioned for the hand-off. The relationships are the 
strongest between players who directly pass the baton, 
but the entire team needs to make a coordinated effort to 
win the race [4]. Unfortunately, stakeholders along the 
supply chain have different and frequently conflicting 
objectives. Accordingly, the stakeholders often operated 
independently, resulting in a phenomenon called the 
bullwhip effect on demand and supply [14], [15], [3], [6]. 
As a result of the bullwhip effect, orders to the supplier 
tend to have larger variance than sales to the buyer (i.e. 
demand distortion), and the distortion propagates 
upstream in an amplified form. 
1.2 Supply Chain Collaboration 
Supply chain collaboration requires industry-wide 
process and data standards for information exchange. It 
requires a reliable and secure data exchange medium to 
facilitate collaborative decision making. Electronic data 
interchange (EDI) was an intial attempt towards 
facilitating communication between trading partners. 
With the advent of the Internet, business documents 
could now be quickly and securely exchanged. 
Organizations such as RosettaNet have developed 
standards and guidelines for automatic system-to-system 
exchange of business information and transaction [7].  
1.3 Incentives for Supply Chain Collaboration 
Enabling collaborative supply chain goes beyond 
resolving the technical issues associated with information 
sharing and joint decision making. Perhaps a bigger 
challenge is for the supply chain partners to understand 
the “lost value” due to uncoordinated decision-making, 
and more importantly, to determine how the recovered 
value will be shared among the participating stakeholders. 
For example, in collaborative forecasting, if there is no 
incentive to bind the customers to their forecasts, the 
customers may be motivated to over-forecast to raise the 
likelihood that the supplier will have sufficient stock 
should the customers require more. On the supplier side, 
if information provided to the customers about the 
supplier’s allocation is not binding, if the supplier’s 
situation changes, it could change the allocation at the 
last minute.  
This paper presents some models for understanding the 
relationships between demand distortion and safety-stock 
level, and describes the enabling technologies for 
collaborative demand planning and replenishment. 
2. B2B Means “Belly-To-Belly” 
The need for information sharing has been increasing as 
a consequence of the globalization of production and 
sales, and the advancement of enabling technologies. 
Improving supply chain efficiencies means the 
companies should direct their focus outside of the four 
walls of their enterprises. E-business technology is 
beginning to restructure the ways businesses conduct 
business. Yet,  no matter how much has changed in the 
new economy, business is still a function of the same 
reciprocal, collaborative process of decision-making that 
defined commerce centuries ago and still applies to 
today's multinational trade. Supply chain collaboration is 
not, and will never be conducted within the confines of 
the impersonal, anonymous environments of computer 
workstations. As Palmer aptly puts it, B2B may as well 
stand for “belly-to-belly” [11]! 
2.1 Inter-Organizational Information Sharing 
Collaborative demand planning begins with information 
sharing. Information sharing can occur within an 
organization (intra-organizational) as well as across 
organizations (inter-organizational).  
A widely cited benefit of information sharing is that it 
can dampen the bullwhip phenomenon. The bullwhip 
effect often results in excess cost, such as inventory cost, 
transportation cost or excess raw materials cost due to 
unplanned and unbalanced production. Using simulation 
and analytical research, [8] shows that sharing “sell-
through” data and inventory information from 
downstream stakeholder might reduce the bullwhip effect 
on upstream stakeholders. 
Inter-organizational information sharing is at the core of 
today's most important business strategies, including 
Web enablement, supply chain management (SCM), 
customer relationship management (CRM), multichannel 
and mobile computing, and self-service applications. 
Inter-organizational information sharing employs 
collaboration techniques to create a multi-echelon supply 
chain involving the focal organization and additional 
suppliers and customers. At present, the most popular 
collaboration models include the Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) model [5], and 
RosettaNet-based software solutions like WebLogic [2].  
CPFR is a set of guidelines supported and published by 
the Voluntary Inter-industry Commerce Standards (VICS) 
Association. Trading partners share their plans for future 
events, and then use an exception-based process to deal 
with changes or deviations from plans. By working on 
issues before they occur, both partners have time to react.  
A supplier can build inventory well in advance of 
receiving a promotional order and carry less safety stock 
at other times. A retailer can alter the product mix to 
reduce the impact of supply problems.  
RosettaNet is an independent, self-funded, non-profit 
consortium founded in 1998. The consortium is dedicated 
to the development and deployment of standard 
electronic commerce interfaces to align the processes 
between IT supply chain partners on a global basis.  
 
As of April 1999, the RosettaNet Managing Board 
consists of 34 CEOs, CIOs, and executives representing 
global members of the IT supply chain, including initial 
board member companies: American Express, CHS 
Electronics, Cisco Systems, CompUSA, Compaq, 
Computacenter, Deutsche Financial Services, EDS, 
Federal Express, GE Information Services, GSA, 
Hewlett-Packard Co., IBM, Ingram Micro Inc., Insight, 
Intel, Microage, Microsoft, Netscape, NEC Technologies, 
Oracle, pcOrder, SAP AG, Tech Data, Toshiba 
Information Systems and United Parcel 
Service( http://xml.coverpages.org/rosettaNet.html). 
2.2 Intra-Organizational Information Sharing 
Intra-organizational information sharing occurs at the 
data level and at the business-process level. These two 
levels of information sharing have been widely studied 
by SCOR [12] and RosettaNet (www.rosettanet.org). 
Solutions such as RosettaNet rely heavily on the 
definition of EDI-like standards for the exchange of data, 
process knowledge, messages, etc. [2].  
Intra-organizational information sharing means creating 
or modifying the interactions among semi-autonomous 
but related application systems, encompassing purchased 
packages, legacy applications and new Web services. 
This is generally realized through ERP or middleware 
serving as an information backbone to transact and 
convert data among disparate systems.  
Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) links together 
diverse systems and applications across the enterprise, 
allowing the organization to keep pace with and respond 
to market changes [9]. An enterprise resource planning 
(ERP) system, on the other hand, provides an integrated 
transaction processing fabric for an organization, which 
enhances organizational performance by reducing 
information inconsistency and by improving transaction-
processing efficiency. 
3. Incentives For Collaboration  
In [13], Sharafali and Co showed that significant savings 
in inventory-related costs could be achieved if the buyer 
and the seller cooperate. In analyzing the buyers’ and the 
sellers’ replenishment decisions, the authors pointed out 
that only the supplier benefits from such cooperation. In 
order to motivate the buyer to cooperate, the authors 
considered some cooperative strategies. These include 
the analysis of the impact of (1) price changes, (2) 
discount policies, and (3) partial deliveries. The authors 
showed that the partial deliveries strategy is preferable. 
This is in tune with the benefits cited in the literature as a 
result of JIT-like relationship between the two parties 
concerned.  
Due to the bullwhip effect, suppliers often have to deal 
with a demand patterns that are perceived to be erratic 
and cyclical. The variability of demand increases in 
moving up the supply chain from consumer to retailers to 
distribution center to central warehouse to factory. This 
section provides some models for understanding the 
advantages of cooperation between the supplier and the 
buyer: collaborative demand planning.  
3.1 Optimal Safety-Stock  
Uncertainties in lead time and demand exert considerable 
influence on the stability and credibility of inventory 
control systems. There are various strategies for coping 
with the many sources of uncertainties. Murthy and Ma 
[10] provide an excellent review along with the possible 
research directions for coping with uncertainties in 
Material requirements planning systems.  
Let Yt = replenishment quantity at period t, for t = 1, 2… 
n, where n is the length of the planning horizon. The 
current period is t =1. If the lead time = L, then Yt, for t = 
1-L, 2-L, .., 0, represent the on-order quantities that are 
expected to arrive in periods 1, 2, .., L-1, L respectively.  
Let It+L-1 = beginning inventory at period t+L. If the 
forecasted demand for period t+L is µt+L, the 
replenishment quantity made L periods ago should at 
least be equal to µt+L - It+L-1 (Otherwise, there would be a 
shortage). Supposed the desired safety stock for period 
t+L is st+L, then ( )[ ] .++++ −+= LtLtLtt IsY µ  Let st+L = 
βt+Lµt+L, i.e., the safety stock is a fraction of the 
forecasted demand. Then, [ ]+−+++ −+= 1)1( LtLtLtt IY µβ . In the literature, the 
βt+L is often referred to as the overplanning factor.  
The actual demand Dt is stochastic and non-stationary. 
Let Gt = demand distribution is with mean µt and 
standard deviation σt. Assume the demand sequence {Dt, 
t = 1, 2...} to be mutually independent. We assume that 
the forecast for each period t is unbiased and is equal to 
µt. Since demand is non-stationary, the optimal 
production ordering quantities vary over the planning 
horizon.  In practice, under such an environment, 
decisions are usually made on a rolling horizon basis. 
That is, each time a period has passed, it is dropped from 
the planning horizon, and the forecast demand for a new 
period is added at the end of the forecast window.   
Suppose demand not met are backordered at a cost of p 
$/unit; and the unit inventory holding cost is h $/unit. If 
the ending inventory in period t is It. the total inventory 
cost for period t is h[It ]+- p[It]-, where [ ] [ ] ),0min(    ),0max( tttt IIandII −== −+ . The 
optimal replenishment problem is to determine Yt, for t = 
1, 2… n, such that: 
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The objective function (1) is convex (see [1]).  Solving 
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Note that (3) is true for any lead-time L, for simplicity 
we assume that L = 0. As we have a rolling schedule, we 
plan for the replenishment quantity for the current period, 
i.e., we consider t = 1. Equation (3) then 
becomes: 1 G 1 11
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We note that the successive overplanning factors are 
constant if the sequence of demands are independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.).  
3.2 Forecast Errors and Safety-Stock  
Suppose Dn is exponentially distributed, 
then G x e xn
xn( )   ,  = − >− −1 01µ . 
Then [ ]1 1 1 1 1− = +− + −e ph p( )β µ , or e hh p− + − = +( )1 1 1 1β µ . 
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. The optimal safety stock 
is a quadratic function of the sales forecast! Clearly, this 
can be seen as the worst-case scenario. If the demand 
distribution is exponentially distributed, the level of 
uncertainly as measured by the variance is as large as the 
forecast itself (the mean).  
Suppose Dn is uniformly distributed over (an , bn), then 
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It can be shown that the optimal safety stock β1µ1 = 
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Apparently 0 < β1 <1. This guarantees that the safety-
stock level will never exceed 100% of forecasts. 
Moreover, if the forecasts are unbiased, then (b1+a1)/2= 
u1, the optimal safety stock is  )()(
)(2 11 abhp
hp −⋅+
−⋅ , 
i.e., the optimal safety-stock level is directly proportional 
to the forecast error = )( 11 ab −⋅κ . It is noteworthy that 
as inventory-holding cost approaches backordering cost, 
the need for safety stock diminishes.  
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